14 февраля  CRJ-100LR (CL-600-2B19)

Accident date14.02.2008
Investigation status
Aircraft registration numberCRJ-100LR (CL-600-2B19)
Place of aircraft departure
Airport of departure
Intended destination
Intended Airport of arrival
Accident siteаэропорт Звартноц (Ереван, Армения)
Aircraft type
Serial №
Aircraft operator
Aircraft ownerавиакомпания «Белавиа»
The date of the completion of the investigation (report)
Number of fatalities0
Victims accuracy
Degree of aircraft destruction
Aviation type
Works type

18 august 2009

     Investigation team of the Interstate Aviation Committee which includes official representatives of aviation authorities of Armenia and Belarus has completed the investigation of non-fatal accident with CRJ-100LR (CL-600-2B19) EW-101PJ aircraft operated by Belavia Airlines occurred in Zvartnots Airport (Erevan, Armenia) on February 14, 2008... 
      In accordance with the Investigation team's conclusion:
      The accident with CRJ-100LR aircraft, registration number EW-101PJ occurred as a result of wings lifting properties loss at takeoff stage that resulted in aircraft stall immediately after RWY liftoff, touching ground by left-hand wing followed by destruction and fire. 
       Wing lifting properties loss by meteorological conditions was caused by rime ice formation which "contaminated" wing surface. Rime ice formation, most probably, was caused by fuel icing during aircraft parking at the airport and taxiing prior to departure as a result of temperature difference between ambient air and cold fuel in tanks after level flying.  
       Exceeding of limitations recommended by FOM up to angle rate by wheel nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated wing" in case of inability to instrumentally monitor this parameter could contribute deterioration of situation. 
       Existing procedural technique of aerodynamic aircraft surfaces state monitoring prior to departure together with inefficiency at takeoff stage, existing stall protection system due to wing high-sensitivity even to insignificant contamination of leading edgecan not fully guarantee prevention of similar accidents in the future.  
       Airworthiness directives on need of wing anti-icing sytem activation at taxiing final stage under actual meteorological conditions were issued by Minister of Transport of Canada after the accident. Anti-icing system activation by the crew prior to takeoff and aircraft anti-icing system could probably prevent the accident. 
       Appropriate safety recommendation based on the investigation results were developed.