|Aircraft registration number||RA-26660|
|Place of aircraft departure|
|Airport of departure|
|Intended Airport of arrival|
|Accident site||in Abyysky District of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)|
|Aircraft operator||"Polar Airlines" Airlines|
|Aircraft owner||"Polar Airlines" Airlines|
|The date of the completion of the investigation (report)||14.07.2017|
|Number of fatalities||0|
|Degree of aircraft destruction||aircraft substantially damaged|
report_ra-26660.pdf (5.91 MB)
The accident with An-26-100 RA-26660 aircraft operated by "Polar Airlines" Air company occurred in Abyysky District of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) on October 11, 2016. According to the available information the crew and passengers on board did not suffer, the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
The Interstate Aviation Committee has assigned the Investigation team of the accident in accordance with the Russian Aviation Legislation. The Investigation team has started its work.
Investigation team of the Interstate Aviation Committee has completed the investigation of the accident with An-26-100 RA-26660 aircraft operated by Polar Airlines JSC, occurred in the area of Belaya Gora Airport of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia, RF) on 11.10.2016.
The accident with An-26-100 RA-26660 aircraft occurred in the day time during the landing in conditions of snow shower and under the meteorological conditions below the specified airport minima (240х4000) that resulted in the crew misidentifying of unpaved snow-compacted RWY, landing on the Indigirka flood plain and the aircraft substantial damage during the landing run.
Most probably the accident was caused by the combination of the following factors:
– lack of crew operating procedures during the approach with reference to a standalone NDB in the Airline FOM;
– violation of operating procedures by the ATC controller resulted in failure to inform the crew that the actual RVR (1900 m) was below the specified aerodrome meteorological minima (the controller had reported the information only related to the snow shower and recommended to fly above the runway);
– PIC was not informed that the actual RVR value is below the specified aerodrome meteorological minima (last reported by the controller value was within the minima);
– presence of multiple reference points on final at a distance of 1000 - 730 m from the RWY threshold (namely: abandoned ships, ship cranes, fuel loading complex and etc.) which as they were covered with snow, could be taken for RWY markers by the crew;
– transition season period resulted in the presence of multiple bare areas on the underlying surface which interfered the visual orientation and seeking the unpaved show-compacted runway (for the crew it was the first flight to the aerodrome in question in winter conditions after summer season end);
– a not inclusive use of navaids on final resulted in a lack of proper aircraft monitoring along the glidepath;
– lack of sufficient conditions for visual observation from the ATC controller's working station of the airplanes approaching with magnetic heading=71°.
Appropriate safety recommendations based on the investigation results were developed.
 In accordance with the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (DOC 9756 AN/965), the factors are listed in chronological order, without priority assessment. The determination of contributing factors is not to apportion blame or liability.