Accident date | 25.11.2014 |
Investigation status | |
Aircraft registration number | RA-02778 |
Place of aircraft departure | |
Airport of departure | Аэропорт Ульяновск (Баратаевка) |
Intended destination | |
Intended Airport of arrival | |
Accident site | а/п Курумоч (г. Самара) |
Latitude | 53º30'04'' |
Longitude | 050º09'14" |
Aircraft type | Beechcraft В-300 |
Serial № | FL-857 |
Aircraft operator | ОАО «Эйр Самара» |
Aircraft owner | ОАО «Государственная транспортная лизинговая компания» |
The date of the completion of the investigation (report) | 05.11.2015 |
Number of fatalities | 0 |
Victims accuracy | |
Degree of aircraft destruction | aircraft substantially damaged |
Report | report_ra-02778.pdf (2.79 MB) |
Aviation type | Commercial air transport |
Works type | |
Note |
The accident with Beechcraft B-300 RA-02778 aircraft owned by "Air Samara" JSC occurred in Kurumoch a/p (Samara, RF) on November 25, 2014.
According to the available information the crew on board didn't suffer, the aircraft was damaged.
The Interstare Aviation Committee has formed the Investigation team of this accident in accordance with the Russian Aviation Legislation. The Investigation team started its work.
The Investigation team of the Interstate Aviation Committee has completed the investigation of the accident with Beechcraft В300 RA-02778 aircraft operated by "Air Samara" JSC occurred on November 25, 2014. The accident with Beechcraft В300 RA-02778 aircraft operated by "Air Samara" Airlines was caused by missing the gear extension operation by the crew during the approach procedure that in conjunction with non-adherence to the "BEFORE LANDING", "LANDING" checklist and no response to terrain awareness warning system (in pull up MODE) resulted in gearless landing, aircraft overrun and its damage.
Missing of standard operations and no response to the warning alert most probably were caused by the significant increase of psycho-emotional tension of the crew members and critical tunneling caused by the detection of premature uncontrolled descent up to the below minima altitude specified by the approach pattern.
Premature descent became possible due to the insignificant proficiency level of the crew members (including the behavior of automatic flight mode and approaches of the crew resource management), non-adherence to standard operation procedures, lack of interaction and cross check as well as low flight training at B300 type aircraft.
Low level of flight operation management in the Airline did not allow to detect and eliminate specified irregularities.
The appropriate safety recommendations based on the investigation results were developed.