Beechcraft В-300 RA-02778 25.11.2014

Accident date25.11.2014
Investigation status
Aircraft registration numberRA-02778
Place of aircraft departure
Airport of departureАэропорт Ульяновск (Баратаевка)
Intended destination
Intended Airport of arrival
Accident siteа/п Курумоч (г. Самара)
Latitude53º30'04''
Longitude050º09'14"
Aircraft type Beechcraft В-300
Serial №FL-857
Aircraft operatorОАО «Эйр Самара»
Aircraft ownerОАО «Государственная транспортная лизинговая компания»
The date of the completion of the investigation (report)05.11.2015
Number of fatalities0
Victims accuracy
Degree of aircraft destructionaircraft substantially damaged
Report

report_ra-02778.pdf (2.79 MB)

Aviation typeCommercial
Works type
Note

26 november 2014

     The accident with Beechcraft B-300 RA-02778 aircraft owned by "Air Samara" JSC occurred in Kurumoch a/p (Samara, RF) on November 25, 2014.
     According to the available information the crew on board didn't suffer, the aircraft was damaged.
     The Interstare Aviation Committee has formed the Investigation team of this accident in accordance with the Russian Aviation Legislation. The Investigation team started its work.
  

17 november 2015

     The Investigation team of the Interstate Aviation Committee has completed the investigation of the accident with Beechcraft В300 RA-02778 aircraft operated by "Air Samara" JSC occurred on November 25, 2014. The accident with Beechcraft В300 RA-02778 aircraft operated by "Air Samara" Airlines was caused by missing the gear extension operation by the crew during the approach procedure that in conjunction with non-adherence to the "BEFORE LANDING", "LANDING" checklist and no response to terrain awareness warning system (in pull up MODE) resulted in gearless landing, aircraft overrun and its damage.
      Missing of standard operations and no response to the warning alert most probably were caused by the significant increase of psycho-emotional tension of the crew members and critical tunneling caused by the detection of premature uncontrolled descent up to the below minima altitude specified by the approach pattern.  

       Premature descent became possible due to the insignificant proficiency level of the crew members (including the behavior of automatic flight mode and approaches of the crew resource management), non-adherence to standard operation procedures, lack of interaction and cross check as well as low flight training at B300 type aircraft.
          Low level of flight operation management in the Airline did not allow to detect and eliminate specified irregularities.  

The appropriate safety recommendations based on the investigation results were developed.